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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JAMES N. THOMAS, and KATHLEEN McMUR TREY THOMAS,
Appellants,
vs.

THE CHILDREN'S A ID S 0 -

Case No.
9419

CIETY, of Ogden, a Corporation,

Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT
This is a Habeas Corpus proceeding commenced
in the District Court of Weber County to regain custody of the infant child of Appellants. The pertinent
facts are set forth in the pleadings R. 54, 64, 136 and
the testimony, R. 182, 183 and 226. The testimony
is voluminous, accumulative, and, in many instances
irrelevant and immaterial, yet we respectfully suggest
that if this Court will read the entire record, it will
appear that the only real issue in this case is the Race
question. The conclusion is inescapable that if the
Appellants in this case had been both of the same race,
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this case would never have reached the courts.
The trial was continued several times at the re.
quest of Respondent for the purpose of securing wit·
nesses on its behalf, which motions were granted b"I
the Court over the objections of Appellants (R. 90
'
91, 98, 101, 116).
Respondent took the depositions of Calvin and
Mary McMurtrey (R. 180), but the McMurtreys ap.
peared in person at the trial (R. 226, page 3), and
for this reason their depositions were not published
or offered in evidence. Notwithstanding this fact, the
seal on this deposition has been broken and opened
without authority of Law and in violation of Rule
30 (b).
The nature of this case makes one wonder how
such flagrant irregularity can happen in a court of
Justice.
After trial, Judgment was entered awarding cus·
tody of the child to the Respondent (R. 168).
The Appellants filed their motion for a new •
trial (R. 15 3), which motion was denied (R. 171).
from which the Appellants prosecute this Appeal and
assign the following:
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ERRORS
1. Error of the Court in continuing the trial
from September 14, 1960 to December 7, 1960, without a showing of due diligence as provided by Law.

2. Error of the Court in not finding on all the
issues as presented by the pleadings and the evidence.
3. Error of the Court in holding that the child
is illegitimate.
Error of the Court in holding that the marriage of the Appellants is void under Section 30-1-2
( 5) , U tab Code 19 5 3 .
4.

5. Error of the Court in finding that the release executed by the mother was not obtained by
duress, undue influence or coercion.
6. Error of the Court in denying Appellants'
Motion for a New Trial.
7.

The Judgment is contrary to the evidence.

8.

The Judgment is contrary to Law.

To sustain this Appeal the Appellants rely on
the following:
POINT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A CONTINUANCE FROM SEPTEMBER 14, 1960.
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POINT II
THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO ITS CUSTODY.
POINT III
SECTION 78-30-4, UTAH CODE 1953, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID AS
APPLIED TO APPELLANT, JAMES N.
THOMAS.
POINT IV
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
FIND ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
POINT V
THE CHILD, IN THIS CASE, IS A LEGITIMATE CHILD.
POINT VI
THE MERE SIGNING OF AN INSTRUMENT AND HANDING IT TO AN OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO TAKE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AS RE·
QUIRED BYLAW.
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POINT VII
SECTION 30-1-2(5) UTAH CODE 1953
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
ARGUMENT
We contended at the trial that the mother was
coerced into giving her child away. We do not waive
that issue, but to brief it here would unduly prolong
this brief.
See, Trigg vs. Trigg, 22 P. 2nd 119, Gardenas
vs Ortiz, 226 P. 418.
POINT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A CONTINUANCE FROM SEPTEMBER 14, 1960.
R. 91, 98, 116,
Rule 40 (b) Utah Code,
Neven vs. Neven, 154 P. 78,
State vs. Ma this, 319 P. 2nd 134.
This case was originally set for trial for August
17, 1960 at 11:00 o'clock A. M. (R. 89).
On August 17, the Appellants appeared in person and with their counsel ready for trial, at which
time the Respondent through its counsel, requested a
continuance to August 31, 1960 (R. 91), but this
continuance had. already been granted the day before
(R. 90).
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On August 24, the Respondent appeared in
Court ex parte and obtained a continuance from Au_
ust 31 to September 14 (R. 101).
g
On August 24, the Appellants appeared in Courr
and moved the Court for an Order denying Respondent's request for a continuance (R. 107).
On September 14, the Court made and entered
its Order vacating the trial date of September 14 (R.
116).
This Order states that it was vacated upon the
request and stipulation of counsel, which is erroneous
in that it was granted over the objections and protest
of the Appellants (R. 110, 111).
At R. 108, Paragraph 4, it was pointed out to
the Court at that time that there was no assurance
made to the Court that Spencer B. Wheatley would
appear for trial on September 14, 1960.
Rule 40 (b) of the Utah Code provides, amoni
other things:

"If the motion is made upon the ground~
of the absence of evidence, such motion shall
also set forth the materiality of the evidence ex·
pected to be obtained and SHALL SHOW
DUE DILIGENCE HAS BEEN USED TO
PROCURE IT."
The Record shows that from the inception of tbi~
case the witness whose evidence was being sought was
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known to the Respondent and that the Respondent
also knew that said witness was a resident of the State
of Idaho and could not be compelled to attend trial
in the State of Utah, and for this reason it is the position of Appellants that it was gross negligence on the
part of the Respondent in not taking the deposition of
said witness in due season.
Rule 40 ( b) cited above, expressly provides that
the Court may, in its discretion, grant a continuance
provided due diligence is shown in trying to obtain
such evidence. Under this Rule there is no discretion
granted in the absence of a showing of due diligence.
Neven vs. Neoen is a Nevada case wherein the
Supreme Court of Nevada said:
''A party who is a material witness in his
own behalf must have his testimony ready for
use at the trial unless prevented from doing so
by some obstacle which by the exercise of reasonable diligence he cannot overcome, and the
obstacle should not be one which he has created
by his own voluntary act. If he allows consideration of business or pleasure or even regard
his own health to call him away for a time
when his suit is liable to be called for trial and
thereby loses the benefit of his own testimony
he must suffer the consequences. A party must
be held to the exercise of good faith and diligence and cannot be heard to complain if the
failure to present his case results from an attempt to subordinate the business of the Court
~o his own business engagements and convenience."
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State vs. Mathis is a Utah case where the··

.
. d'
d
nght
to a contmuance 1s 1scusse and the authorities ana.
lyzed and, even though the continuance there com.
plained of was upheld, one concurring Justice questioned the validity of the decision and one Justice
wrote a strong and forceful dissenting opinion and in
this we respectfully submit to this Court that the
authority of the trial court to grant a continuance
should be resricted to those cases where there is a show.
ing of diligence as provided by the statute. The pub.
lication and reception of this deposition in evidenc~
was duly objected to at the trial R., 226, Page 92.

POINT II
THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO ITS CUSTODY.
55-10-32, U. C. 1953,
55-10-6, u. c. 1953,
55-10-19, u. c. 1953,
77-4-10, u. c. 1953,
77-60-12, u. c. 1953,
10 c. J. s. 83,
Utah Fuel Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 234 r
697,
Re a Minor, 155 F. 2nd 870,
Gen. 1 :28.
The Court found, and we assume, for the sakeol
this point, that the child is illegitimate.
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On the Sixth day of Creation, God made Man,
in His own image, and directed him as follows:
''Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish
the Earth . . . " Gen. 1:28.
At that time there was no law upon the subject
of marriage and from that day forward, men have been
begetting children by their wives, their concubines,
their maid-servants, and the harlots in the streets, but,
in all instances and on all occasions, the fathers have
been required to, and did, support and provide for
their offspring, with few exceptions under the Common Law.
Today, m Utah, the father of an illegitimate
child is required by statute to support such child.
Section 5 5-10-19 provides, among other things:

'' * * * the Court shall adjudge that
he pay to the Court a sum of money not exceeding two-hundred dollars ($200) for the
first year after the birth of such child and a
sum not exceeding one-hundred-fifty dollars
( $15 0) yearly for seven teen years succeeding
said first year for the support and maintenance
and education of such child."
Section 5 5- 10- 3 2 provides:
"No child as defined in this Chapter shall
be taken from the custody of its parents .
without the consent of such parents."
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Section 5 5-10-6 defines parent:
'.' 'Parent', wh.en used in relation to a child
shall mclude guardian and everv person wh 01 •
by Law liable to maintain a child."
J

and child:
"The word 'child' means a person Jess
than eighteen ( 18) years of age."
Section 77-60-12 provides:
"The father of such child shall not have
the right to its custody or control, if the mother
is living and wishes to retain such custody and
control, until after it shall have arrived at the
age of ten years unless upon petition of the District Court of the county in which the mother
resides, it shall upon full hearing after notice
to the mother, be made to appear that the
mother is not a suitable person to have the cus·
tody and control of said child."

1

1

Under the title, "Bastards", 10 C. J. S. 83, it is
said:

"While it has been stated broadly that the
putative father of a bastard or illegitimate child
has no parental power or authority over such
child, and that the father is not entitled to the
custody and services of the child, in the ~bsence
of statute or contract giving him the nght to
custody and imposing on him the duty to sup·
port and there are expressions to the effec.t thar
the father is not entitled to the custody m the 1.
absence of a correlative duty to support the
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child, it has been held or recognized that the
putative father is in general entitled to custody
against all but the mother."
Section 7 7 -4-10 provides:
"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the
person who acknowledged himself to be the
father of such child, and in all cases is an heir
of his mother; and inherits his or her estate, in
whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same
manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. The issue of all marriages null in law, or
dissolved by divorce, are legitimate."
In the case of Utah Fuel Company vs. Industrial
Commission, supra, this statute was construed as follows:
"In view, therefore, that under our statute ... the marriage of applicant to the deceased
was null and void under our statute . . . the
applicant could not be awarded compensation
under the Industrial Act. Keeping in mind,
however, all of the provisions of our statute,
we are forced to the conclusion that it was the
intention of the Legislature of this state to declare all of those children that are the fruit of
marriages that are void under our statute ...
as legitimate and entitled to all the benefits of
children born in lawful wedlock ... The law
is humane and appeals to every man's sense of
justice and fairness. Why should a child which
is the fruit of a void marriage be punished for
the wrongful act of its parents? If any punishment is to be inflicted, let it fall upon those
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who are the actors in the drama and not up
the i~nocent and helpless. Moreover, societ/1~
~e~e~1t~ed by every humane and. jus.t law, while
1t is mJured by every law that mfhcts injustic 2
~P?n eve~ the humblest me~ber of society lt
is JU~t as important that. c~1ldren born of such
marnages be protected as it is that other children
are. The conclusion of the Commission awarding compensation to the beneficiary is therefore
not vulnerable to the objection raised by plaintiff."

U tab statutes express! y provide for the support

of an illegitimate child by its reputed father and gives
him the right to its custody against all the world except the mother. There are certain provisions of the
statute which authorizes the taking of children from
the custody of both of the parents under certain con·
ditions, none of which are involved in this case.
A case in point under statutes similar to those
cited above is In re Minor, supra, in which the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia said:
"We hold that it was error for the court to
enter the decree of adoption when the interests
of this father were not fully before the court for
consideration, his name and location being
known, and he having been afforded no oppor·
tunity to present to the court an acknowledg·
ment of the adoptee. If, being afforded t~at
opportunity, he failed to acknowledge the ch1Jd,
his consent is not necessary under the statute.
If he does acknowledge it, his consent is ne~es·
sary, in view of what we have to say concerning
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his contribution in the support of the adoptee."
At the trial in the Court below, and upon Appellants· :fvlotion for a New Trial. counsel for Respondent argued that the father of an illegitimate child has
no rights to its custody and relied upon Section 7830-4, which authorizes the mother of an illegitimate
child to give it away for adoption.
POINT III
SECTION 78-30-4, UTAH CODE 1953, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID AS
APPLIED TO APPELLANT, JAMES N.
THOMAS.

Mills vs. Brown, 88 P. 609,
Reyne vs. Trade Comm., 192 P. 2nd 563,
190,

Union Trust vs. Simmons, 211 P. 2nd
Hurwitz vs. North, 264 S. W. 678,
16 C. J. S. 566, and cases there cited,
78-30-4. U. C. 1953.

Section 78-30-4 provides, among other things:
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted
without the consent of its parents, if living, nor
an illeaitimate child without the consent of its
mothe~, if living, except that consent is not necessary from a father or mother who has been
judicially deprived of the custody of the child
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on account of cruelty, neglect, or desertion."
Under this provision of the statute counsel con.
tended, and the Court held, that the consent of the
father was not necessary, (R. 165, Paragraph 3).
It is the position of Appellants that if such a
construction can be placed upon this statute. then that
statute is unconstitutional and void in that it authorizes a private individual to deprive another individual
of his natural, statutory, and constitutional rights
without a hearing of any kind.
In this case the father had not been deprived of
the custody of his child on account of cruelty, neglect,
or desertion, or otherwise determined to be an unfit
father to have the custody of his child.
Under the title, "Constitutional Law", 16 C. J
S. cited above, it is said at page 566:
"Inasmuch as the power to legislate is b~
nature non-delegatable, a fortiori, it may not be
delegated to a private person or persons."
This doctrine seems to be supported by the over·
whelming weight of authority.
The power of the Legislature to delegate its
power was discussed at length, by this Court, in the
case of Mill vs. Brown, supra, in which the custody
of a child was directly involved. The question pre·
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sented involved the power of the Legislature to provide for the commitment of a child to the Industrial
School without givmg its parents an opportunity to
be beard.
In holding Section 7 of Chapter 117, Laws of
Utah, 1905 unconstitutional and void, this Court
said:

"As we have already pointed out, the proceedings of the juvenile court do not fall, nor
are they intended to come, within what is
termed criminal procedure, nor are the acts
therein mentioned, as applied to children,
crimes. To constitute the acts under Section 7
of an adult a crime, entitles such adult to the
right of a trial as for any other crime. This
right is denied by said Section 7 and it cannot,
therefore, be upheld. Quite true, some method
is necessary to punish adults when interfering
with children who may be held to be wards of
the state, and no doubt it is proper for the Legislature to provide for their punishment. When
such is done, however, trial must be provided
for in the proper forum and legal manner. Section 7 of the act, for the reason that it violates
this elementary provision, so to speak, of criminal law and procedure, must, therefore, be held
of no force or effect."
After analyzing further authorities, the Court
continued:
"But there is another reason for which we
think the judgment cannot be permitted to
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stand. By a careful examination of th
a.hove cited, it will be found that all the cdases
. .
e ec1~io1:1s rest upon t h e proposition that the state
m its sovereigbn power. ha sf the right, when necessary, to su stit_ute itse 1 as guardian of the
person of the child for that of the parent
01
other legal guardian, and thus to educate a '
save the child from a criminal career·' that
:,no
..
ll 11
the welfare of th~ c~ild tha~ moves the state t~
act, and. not. to ~nfh.ct punishment or to mete
out retributive Justice for any offense com.
mitted or threaten ed. In other words, to do that
which it is the duty of the father or guardian
to do, and which the law assumes he will do bv
reason of the love and affection he holds for his
offspring and out of regard for the child's fu.
ture welfare. The duty thus rests upon the
father first, so it must likewise logically follow
that he must be given the first right to discharge that duty."

Reyne vs. Trade Commission, is a Utah case

wherein this Court held a statute unconstitutional
which granted power to the Executive Board of the
Barbers' Union to compel all barbers to close their
shops at a certain time and charge a certain fee io:
their services, by saying, at page 568:
"Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act are uncon·
stitutional as an improper delegation of author·
ity."
The right of a man to enjoy the comfort, plea·
sure and companionship of his children is a fundamental and natural right which is protected by both state,
and federal, constitutions.
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In Hurwitz vs. North, supra, the Supreme Court
of Missouri said:
"Due process does not always mean a court
hearing, but there must be a hearing after due
notice, and an opportunity to defend the right
involved before a legally constituted body for
determining such a right of the citizen."

In speaking of illegitimate children, Sec. 78-30-4
says:

"* * * except that consent from a
father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account
of cruelty, neglect, or desertion, is not necessary

* * *"

In its first breath the legislature says that the consent of the mother is necessary, if she is living, but is
silent as to the father, which implies that his consent
is not necessary. In its second breath it says that the
consent of a father is not necessary if h'e has been judicially deprived of custody, etc. which implies that
his consent is necessary.
We have pointed out herein, wherein the Legislature may not directly delegate power to an individual
to deprive another individual of his rights-queryMay the Legislature, by implication, delegate such
power? These two provisions of the act, being inconsistent and irreconcilable with each other, the latter
should prevail and ·the former held void.
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The unconstitutionality of Section 78- 30-4
called to the attention of the Court in App ll wa'.
e ants
Motion for a New Trial (R. 153) and the sam
.
·
'
e Was
denied by the Court (R. 171).
POINT IV
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
FIND ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
30-1-3, 4,

u. c.

1953,

U. R. C. P. Rule 5 2,
Gaddis Investment Co. vs. Morrison, 278
P. 2nd 284,
Cases there cited.
Respondent alleged that Appellants' marriage is
void by reason of a former marriage (R. 66, Para·
graph 4). Appellants alleged that their marriage was
entered into, in good faith, thinking that JAMES'
first wife had divorced him (R. 68, Paragraph 4).
Respondent alleged that the marriage was void because
prohibited by Utah miscegenation statutes (R. 66,
Paragraph 4). Appellants testified that their marriage
took place in Idaho and that they returned to Utah
only for the purpose of securing custody of their child
and to pay a few debts (R. 182, page 74). On both
of these issues there is no conflict in the evidence, but
the Court made no finding on either issue.
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In the Morrison case, this Court, following a
Jong line of previous decisions, said:
"It appears that the judgment was based
principally upon the findings that the contract
was entered into and the commission had not
been paid, totally disregarding defendant's answer to the complaint. It has been frequently
held that the failure of the trial court to make
findings of fact on all material issues is reversible error where it is prejudicial."
Section 30-1-3 provides that when a marriage is
contracted in good faith, thinking a former spouse has
obtained a divorce, the children of such marriage are
legitimate, thus it was a very material issue in this case,
whether or not JAMES, in good faith, thought he was
divorced.
Section 30-1-4 provides that marnages contracted in another country or state are valid here. This
Court has held that marriages are not valid where the
parties go elsewhere for the purpose of evading the
laws of this state and return here to live. The pleadings and evidence show that the marriage in question
was contracted in Idaho, thus it was a material issue
as to whether or not Appellants returned to Utah to
make it their home; the Court made no findings on
either of these issues and thereby committed reversible
error.
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POINT V
THE CHILD, IN THIS CASE, IS A LEGITIMATE CHILD.
30-1-3, U. C. 1953,
30-1-4, U. C. 1953,
77-60-14, U. C. 1953,
78-30-12, U. C. 1953,
Harrison

697,

VS.

Harker, 142 P. 716,

Utah Fuel Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 234 P.
Ex Parte Hart, 130 P. 704.

Section 3 0-1- 3 provides:
''When a marriage is contracted in good
faith and in the belief of the parties that a for·
mer husband or wife, then living and not leg·
ally divorced, is dead or legally divorced, the
issue of such marriage born or begotten before
notice of the mistake shall be the legitimate is·
sue of both parties.''
Section 30-1-4 provides:
"Marriages solemnized in any other c?un·
try, state or territory if valid where solemnized.
are valid here.''
Section 77-60-14 provides:

"If the mother of any such child and the
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father shall at any time after its birth intermarry, the child shall and in all respects be
deemed legitimate."
Section 78-30-12 provides:
. "The father of. an .illegiti-:1iate child, by
publicly acknowledging 1t as his own, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he
is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time
of its birth."
Under Point II we pointed out the failure of the
Court to make findings on the issues as to whether or
not the marriage of Appellants was contracted in good
faith and whether or not they returned to Utah to
live. Those two issues were material issues in this case,
under the above cited statutes.
Harrison

vs. Harker deals specifically with Sec-

tion 78-30-12, in which this Court said:

"It is urged that the father ... has none.
This on the ground that a father has no right
to the custody of a child born out of wedlock .
. . . But I am satisfied the marriage, and the
father by his petition publicly acknowledging
the child to be his, and seeking its custody as
his own, legitimated it. What more public acknowledgment could be made than was made
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by t~e fathe~-an acknowledgment of
bmdmg on him for all time?··

record

In Fuel Co. vs. I~d. Comm., this Court held that
eve~ though the marriage was void in law, the off.
spnng of such marriage is legitimate and entitled
inherit from its father, saying, at page 699:
to
. . "Keeping in mind, however, all of the pro.
v1s1ons of our statute, we are forced to the con.
clusion that it was the intention of the Legislature of this state to declare all of those children
that are the fruit of marriages that are void
under our statute (unless those mentioned in
section 64 3 0 are an exception) as legitimate and
entitled to all the benefits of children born in
lawful wedlock."

Ex Parte Hart is a California case wherein the
father accused his wife of adultery and sought a di·
vorce on that ground, he gave the child to the Child·
ren' s Home Society for the purpose of adoption. Tht
mother brought Habeas Corpus proceedings to recover
custody of the child after it had been released for adoption, and in allowing the writ, the Supreme Court of
California said:
"The mere relinquishment by the father
without the mother joining therein, could have
no effect, except where there had been a pnor
adjudication with reference to her adultery.
Here there had been no adjudication, and at the
date of the execution of the instrument the
mother possessed the right to be heard and to
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resist any attempt to relinquish parental control
of the child to the. C~ild~en's Home Society.
The subsequent adjudication of her previous
adultery would not have the effect to destroy
that right. The child, then, was in the custody
of the Children's Home Society by the sufferance of the father alone, without the mother's
consent; the respondents by assuming custody
under authority of the Children's Home Society, acquired no right as against the mother."
In the instant case JAMES married Anna Lou on
June 3, 19 56 and they separated on July 4, 19 56 and
never lived together again and shortly thereafter, she
started proceedings to divorce him (R. 182, pages 20
to 24), and according to his undisputed testimony,
JAMES thought she had divorced him. Under these
circumstances it is the position of Appellants that the
consent of the wife referred to in the statute is not
applicable here. In other words, it was not the intent
of the Legislature that a man should have the consent
of an estranged ex-wife before he could adopt a child
as his own. In this we respectfully submit that this
child, under law, is the legitimate child of JAMES and
cannot be adopted without his consent.
POINT VI
THE MERE SIGNING OF AN INSTRUMENT AND HANDING IT TO AN OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO TAKE AC KNOWLEDGMENTS DOES NOT CONST!-
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TUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AS R
QUIRED BY LAW.
E.
77-30-4, U. C. 1953,

Spangler VS. Third District Court 140 p
2nd 755,
'
·
People vs. O' Riley, 86 N. Y. 154,
State vs. Finn, 52 P. 756,
810,

Throwbridge vs. Bisson, 44 N. W 2 d
· n
Wilde vs. Buchanan, 303 S. W. 2nd 518,
Pardo vs. Creamer, 310 S. W. 2nd 218,
Bradley vs. U. S. 218 F. 2nd 657,
In Re Beecher, 50 F. S. 2nd 530.

The last part of Section 77-30-4 provides:

'' * * * Whenever it shall appear that
the parent or parents whose consent would
otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ· '
ing, acknowledged before any officer author· :
ized to take acknowledgments, released his or
her, or their control or custody of such child to
any agency licensed to receive children for place·
ment or adoption under Chapter 3 of th1~
Title."
The evidence shows the circumstances under
which the mother signed the release, the substance of
which is, after months, weeks, days, and hours of .
persuasion, coercion, duress, and undue influence, she .
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placed her signature on the instrument and Mr.
Wheatley snatched it out of her hand, put it in his
brief case and went away (R. 183, pages 3 7 to 69).

Spangler vs. District Court, supra, is a Utah
case wherein this Court said:

"To constitute the taking of an oath, there
must be definite evidence that affiant was not
only conscious that he was taking an oath, but
there must be some outward act from which
that consciousness can definitely be inferred,
which cannot be done from the mere signature
to a printed form of oath."
In State vs. Finn, the Supreme Court of Oregon
said:

·'Without a direct administration of the
oath, there can be no affidavit, under the statute. And, while a non-observance of the exact
formula in its administration may not release
the affiant of legal responsibility under it, yet,
it is plain that there must be some actual and
bona fide attempt at a due observance of the
law's requirements to give validity to the document as an affidavit."
''The defendant seeks to excuse or palliate
his conduct, as it respects his certification of the
alleged affidavit, by asserting that the manner
in which he obtained the assent of the affiants
thereto was the usual manner of administering
oaths in such cases. If this is true, there is a
signal vice in the practice; and as was said by
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finch, Judge In Re Eldridge. 82 N. y
~t would only.make our duty the more i~ 16e/
t1ve that the vice may be eradicated.· " p d·
We contend that it was the intention of the Le .
islature, by requiring that the signature to be acknow~
edged before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. was to require and does require more
solemnity than a mere informal admission that one
owes a debt. If the Legislature had intended such informal acknowledgment, it would not have required
the same to be made before a person authorized by Jaw
to take oaths.
POINT VII
SECTION 30-1-2(5) UTAH CODE 1953
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.

14,

U. S. Constitution Amendments L 5 and

Utah Constitution, Article L Sections L
4, 7. 24 and 27.

Parez vs. Lippold, 198 P. 2d 17,

Oyamma vs. O'Neill, Case No. 61269

S. Ct. Pima Co., Arizona.

The court held that the marriage of the appel·
lants was unlawful, prohibited and void for violation
of the provisions of Section 30-1-2 ( 5) U. C. A

19 5 3 ( R. 16 5 ) .
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We refer the court to Appellants' memorandums
R 42 and 133 which are made a part hereof by reference.
We pointed out there and repeat here that under
the Equal Protection clauses of both Federal and State
Constitutions a State is required to grant all citizens
the equal protection of the law. Assuming, but not
admitting. that the State Legislature may, for the best
interest. \Velfare and protection of its citizens, prohibit
inter-racial marriages-Query: May the Legislature
in the face of the above cited constitutional prohibitions, legislate to protect the purity of one race alone?
If public welfare requires keeping the white race pure,
why doesn't public welfare require keeping all other
races pure?
The Court will observe that the provlSlons of
Section 3 0- 1- 2 ( 5) and ( 6) only prohibits inter-marriage between the races therein named with white persons, but it does not prohibit inter-marriage between
rhose other races with each other, and for this reason
Jlone that statute is repugnant to the Equal Protection clauses of both Federal and State Constitutions.
CONCLUSION
In our opening statement we called the court's
attention to the magnitude of the record in this case,
most of which was irrelevant and immaterial, and calculated to cloud, camouflage and confuse the real issue.
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For instance, the respondent claimed th
,
at appe
.
.
1ants were msane, slCk, unfit persons to ha h 1·
Ve t e CU!.
.
to d y o f their child and the best interest of th . ,
· d h ·
e ch1la
require. t at 1t be taken from them and p1aced for
adoption, but the trial court would not be m·ISie·db
such subterfuge (R. 226, pages 144, 145).
i

Respondent a~so contended that the marriage JI
appellants was v01d for two reasons: (1) becaul1
James had a former wife from whom he was notdJ.
vorced; and ( 2) because marriages between whit1
and negroes are forbidden by statute.
The first of these two contentions was who!!;
irrelevant in that Utah statutes legitimates such chM
1
ren and secondly the statute relied on is unconstltu·
tional and void, and in this the trial court was led into '
error.
We have shown in this brief the status of achila
born under the circumstances revealed by the facts in
this case, that is, that the parents of such child are err
titled to its custody until deprived thereof by the pro
cesses provided by law; that the father of such chil011
entitled to its custody, subject only to the first ri~n: ·
of the mother, even if such child is determined to~
illegitimate. We have shown that under the circum
11
stances of this case, the child is legitimate and ili
court has said that an innocent child should not~
bastardized because of the sins of its parents.
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\Ve contended in the trial court, and we contend
here. that the miscegenation statute is not applicable
because the marriage did not take place in Utah, but
the respondent msisted upon injecting that issue into
this case and the court accepted the issue and held the
statute to be constitutional, and valid.
We have pointed out how the mother was coerced into giving the child away, and the invalidity of
rhe statute under which she did so.
Say what one may, the real and only germane
issue presented by the record in this case is the race
issue, and the application of the principles of Democracy as defined by our founding fathers, in the resolutions of that issue. The founding fathers said:
"We hold these truths to be self evidentthat all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights-that among these are, life, liberty and
tbe pursuit of happiness."
Our forefathers fought a bloody Civil war to preserve those principles. This nation joined the conflagration of World War II to help conquer a "master
race'' in Germany; and incidentally, the appellant,
James, served in that war. Today the free peoples of
the world are still watching and waiting to see if a
nation so conceived, can endure.
One sure way to preserve that nation is to practice the lesson taught on the Mount, where it was said:
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''Not everyone that saith unto me L d
Lord, shall enter the Kingdom of Heav~n °b '.
he that doeth
the will of my Father which,isutIn
,,
H eaven.
And to this end we respectfully submit that, th,
law should protect the appellants in their right to thi
custody of their child the same as if they were both oi
the same racial origin and in this we submit that the
judgment should be reversed and remanded with com
to appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

D. H. OLIVER,
Attorney for Appellanti.

13 8 South 2nd East,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

1

